I should be doing something else, but I can't resist asking this basic question about Internet governance: How can any alternate institutional arrangement provide the assurance of continued price regulation for the DNS name registration market? The recent letter (2008/12/18) from DOC to ICANN on the new gTLD process contains a copy of a letter from the Anti-trust Division in the DOJ, unveiling a competition analysis of the name registration market. Basic facts, looking at the big picture: (1) The price regulation for the name registration market is a foremost result of the ICANN oversight by the USG. (2) The DOC contracts, notably the collaborative agreement, are instrumental in this price regulation effectiveness -- this is verified according to the above letters at the time of the ICANN-Verisign litigation settlement and verified nowadays with the DOJ demand for price regulation provisions in new gTLD contracts. (3) Arguably, the .com registration prices would increase significantly if Verisign was not constrained by enforceable price regulation mechanisms. We just saw how the DOJ anti-trust division applies the USG executive branch power. It appears effective in preventing blatant market abuses, but presumably not optimal in an economic sense. I don't see relevance in the argument that price regulation addresses only the needs of trademark owners, and that Internet governance arrangements should be driven by a wider set of considerations. Perhaps "survey-stlouiscollege-1995.com" benefits as much as "boeing.com" from regulated name registration market, but that's also almost irrelevant. The challenge is to propose institutional arrangements that provide an equivalent predictability and enforceability of price regulation. Plus the many other potential benefits of better governance. I doubt the challenge can be met. A direct confrontation of the USG oversight of ICANN would thus be counterproductive. Other avenues should be preferred.